The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK-security arguments. We propose a strong security model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper-proof device is used to store long-lived keys, while session keys are used on an untrusted host machine. The SMQV protocol meets our security definition under the Gap DiffieHellman assumption and the Random Oracle model.
Introduction
Much of recent research on key agreement deals with provably secure key exchange. Since this approach was pioneered by Bellare and Rogaway [1] , different models were proposed [3, 5, 31, 7, 14, 17] . Among these models, the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) [7] and extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) [17] models (which are incomparable [10, 34] ) are considered as "advanced" approaches to capture security of key agreement protocols; and security arguments for recent protocols are usually provided in the (e)CK models.
Broadly, a security model specifies, among other things, what constitutes a security failure, and what adversarial behaviors are being protected against. The aim is that a protocol shown secure, in the model, confines to the minimum the effects of the considered adversarial behaviors. In the CK and eCK models, session specific information leakages are respectively captured using reveal queries on session states and ephemeral keys, which stores session specific information; the adversary is supposed to interact with parties, and to try to distinguish a session key from a randomly chosen value. A protocol is secure if an adversary controlling communications between parties, cannot distinguish a session key from a random value, unless it makes queries which overtly reveal the session key.
Unfortunately, adversaries do not always behave as expected. When leakages on intermediate results in computing session keys are considered, (e)CK-secure protocols often fail in authentication; and the widely accepted principle that an attacker should not be able to impersonate a party, unless it knows the party's static key is not achieved. This makes clearly desirable a security model, which captures intermediate results leakages resilience, in addition to the security attributes considered in the (e)CK models. state is defined to be the ephemeral DH exponent 1 , while the protocol P is (formally) CK-secure, its practical security is unsatisfactory, unless session identifiers are added with further restrictions. If session identifiers are nonces generated by initiators, the protocol P practically fails in authentication. As an illustration, consider Attack 1, wherein the attacker impersonatesÂ, exploiting a knowledge of an ephemeral DH exponent used atÂ.
Attack 1 Impersonation Attack against P using ephemeral DH exponent leakage I) At the activation of a session (Â,B, s, I), the attacker A does the following: (a) InterceptÂ's message toB (B,Â, s, X, t A ).
(b) Perform a session SesssionStateReveal query on (Â,B, s, I) (to obtain x).
(c) Send (Â,B, s, I,1, 0 |q| ) toÂ, where1 is the identity element in G and 0 |q| is the string consisting of |q| zero bits (as1 ∈ G * ,Â aborts the session (Â,B, s, I)). II) When A decides later to impersonateÂ toB, it does the following: The attacker makesB run a session and derive a key with the belief that its peer isÂ; in addition, the attacker is able to compute the session key thatB derives; in practice, this makes the protocol fail in authentication. The capture of impersonation attacks based on ephemeral DH leakages is insufficient in the CK-model, unless the matching sessions definition is added with further restrictions.
The reason is that (in a formal analysis) the attacker A cannot use the session atB (in which it impersonatesÂ) as a test session, since the matching session is exposed, while there is no guarantee that (in practice)B would not run and complete such a session. If matching sessions are defined using matching conversations, it becomes clear that Protocol P is formally and practically insecure. Indeed, in this case, a leakage of an ephemeral DH exponent in a session allows an attacker to impersonate indefinitely the session owner to its peer in the exposed session.
On the NAXOS Transformation. In the eCK model [17] , all computations performed to derive a session key have to deterministically depend on the ephemeral key, static key, and communication received from the peer.
The design and security arguments of many eCK secure protocols, among which CMQV [33] , NAXOS(+, -C) [17, 20, 24] , and NETS [19] , use the NAXOS transformation [17] , which consists in defining the ephemeral DH exponent as the digest of a randomly chosen value and the static private key (of the session owner), and (unnaturally) destroying it after each use. The ephemeral key is then defined to be the random value. However, from a practical perspective, it seems difficult to see how the NAXOS transformation prevents leakages on the ephemeral DH exponents. And, in any environment, which does not guarantee that leakages on DH exponents cannot occur, the NAXOS type protocols security is at best unspecified.
Consider, for instance, Protocol 2, it is from an earlier version 2 of [10] . If the ephemeral keys are defined to be r A and r B (as in the NAXOS security arguments [17] ) and the signature scheme is secure against chosen message attacks, Protocol 2 can be shown eCKsecure. (a) Verify that X ∈ G * . (b) Verify that σ A is valid with respect toÂ's public key and the message (B, X).
Protocol 2
Verify that σ B is valid with respect toB's public key and the message (Y,Â, X). a) ). IV) The shared session key is K.
The protocol is however insecure if the ephemeral keys are defined to contain the 2 http://eprint.iacr.org/cgi-bin/versions.pl?entry=2009/253, version 20090625. ephemeral DH exponents. As an adversary which (partially 3 ) learns H 1 (r A , a) in a session initiated atÂ with peerB, can indefinitely impersonateÂ toB. For this purpose, the attacker replays toBÂ's message in the session in which H 1 (r A , a) leakage happened (namely (B, X, σ A )), and computes the session key thatB derives, using H 1 (r A , a) and the ephemeral public key Y fromB.
Stronger Security
In this section, we describe the strengthened eCK model, which considers leakages on intermediate results (the values a party may need to compute between messages or before a session key), encompasses the eCK model [17] , and provides stronger reveal queries to the attacker.
A common setting wherein key agreement protocols are often implemented is that of a server used together with a (computationally limited) tamper-resistant device, which stores the long-lived secrets. In such a setting, safely reducing the non-idle time computational effort of the device, is usually crucial for implementation efficiency. To reduce the device's non-idle time computational effort, ephemeral keys can be computed on the device in idle-time, or on the host machine when the implemented protocol is ephemeral DH exponent leakage resilient.
In many DH protocols, (C, FH, H)MQV-C [18, 33, 29, 14, 15] and NAXOS(+,-C) [20, 24, 17] , for instance, the computation of the intermediate results is more costly than that of the ephemeral public key. For these protocols, implementations efficiency is significantly enhanced when the ephemeral keys are computed on the device, while the intermediate results, which require expensive on-line computations and session keys are computed on the host machine. Unfortunately the security of the (e)CK-secure protocols, when leakages on the intermediate results are considered is at best unspecified. A security definition which captures attacks based on intermediate result leakages is clearly desirable. The model we propose captures such attacks, together with the attacks captured in the (e)CK models.
Session. We suppose n L(|q|) (for some polynomial L) partiesP i=1,··· ,n supposed to be probabilistic polynomial time machines and a certification authority (CA) trusted by all parties. The CA is only required to verify that public keys are valid ones (i.e., public keys are only tested for membership in G * ; no proof of possession of corresponding private keys is required). Each party has a certificate binding its identity to its public key. A session is an instance of the considered protocol, run at a party. A session at A (with peerB) can be created with parameter (Â,B) or (B,Â, m), where m is an incoming message, supposed fromB;Â is the initiator if the creation parameter is (Â,B), otherwise a responder. At session activation, a session state is created to contain the information specific to the session. Each session is identified with a tuple (P i ,P j , out, in, ς), whereinP i is the session holder,P j is the intended peer, out and in are respectively the concatenation of the messagesP i sends toP j , or believes to be fromP j , and ς isP i 's role in the session (initiator or responder). Two sessions with identifiers (P i ,P j , out, in, ς) and
and at completion in = out ′ and out = in ′ .
For the two-pass DH protocols, each session is denoted with an identifier (Â,B, X, ⋆, ς), whereÂ is the session holder,B is the peer, X is the outgoing message, ς indicates the role ofÂ in the session (initiator (I) or responder (R)), and ⋆ is the incoming message Y if it exists, otherwise a special symbol meaning that an incoming message is not received yet; in that case, whenÂ receives the public key Y, the session identifier is updated to (Â,B, X, Y, ς). Two sessions with identifiers (Â,B, X, Y, I) and (B,Â, Y, X, R) are said to be matching. Notice that the session matching (B,Â, Y, X, R) can be any session (Â,B, X, ⋆, I); as X, Y ∈ R G * , a session cannot have (except with negligible probability) more than one matching session.
Adversary and Security. The adversary A, is a probabilistic polynomial time machine; outgoing messages are submitted to A for delivery (A decides about messages delivery). A is also supposed to control session activations at each party via the Send(P i ,P j ) and Send(P j ,P i , Y ) queries, which makeP i initiate a session with peerP j , or respond to the (supposed) session (P j ,P i , Y, ⋆, I). We suppose that the considered protocol is implemented at a party following one of the approaches hereunder. We suppose also that at each party an untrusted host machine is used together with a tamper-resistant device. Basing our model on these implementation approaches does not make it specific; rather, this reduces the gap that often exists between formal models and practical security. Such modeling techniques, which take into account hardware devices and communication flows between components, were previously used in [6] . Approach 1. In this approach, the static keys are stored on the device (a smart-card, for instance) the ephemeral keys are computed on the host machine, passed to the smart-card together with the incoming public keys; the device computes the session key, and provides it to the host machine (application) for use. The information flow between the device and the host machine is depicted in Figure (1a) . This implementation approach is safe for eCK-secure protocols when ephemeral keys are defined to be ephemeral DH exponents, as a leakage on an ephemeral DH exponent does not compromise the session in which it is used. In addition, when an attacker learns a session key, it gains no useful information about the other session keys. Approach 2. Another approach, which has received less attention in the formal treatment of DH protocols, is when the ephemeral keys, and top level intermediate results are computed on the device, and the host machine is provided with some intermediate results IR with which it computes the session key. As the computation of the intermediate results is often more costly than that of the ephemeral public keys, implementation efficiency is often significantly enhanced using this approach. Naturally, this comes with the requirement that leakages on the intermediate results should not compromise any unexposed session. Namely, an adversary may have a malware running on the host machine at a party, and learn all values computed or used at the party, except those stored in the party's tamper-proof device; this should not compromise any unexposed session. We define two sets of queries, modeling leakages that may occur on either implementation approaches. We consider leakages on ephemeral and static private keys, and also on any intermediate (secret) value which evaluation requires a secret information. As the adversary can compute any information which evaluation requires only public information, considering leakages on such data is superfluous. In Set 1, which models leakages in the first implementation approach, the following queries are allowed.
• EphemeralKeyReveal(session): this query models leakages on ephemeral DH exponents.
• Corrupt SC (party): this query models an attacker which (bypasses the eventual tamper protection mechanisms on the device, and) gains read access to the device's private memory; it provides the attacker with the device owner's static private key.
• SessionKeyReveal(session): when the attacker issues this query on an already completed session, it is provided with the session key.
• EstablishParty(party): with this query, the adversary registers a static key on behalf of a party; as the adversary controls communications, from there the party is supposed totally controlled by A. A party against which this query is not issued is said to be honest. In Set 2, which models leakages on the second implementation approach, the following queries are allowed; the definitions remain unchanged for the queries belonging also to Set 1.
• For any node in the intermediate results, which computation requires a secret value, a reveal query is defined to allow leakage on the information computed in this node. These queries models leakages that may occur on intermediate results in computing session keys.
• SessionKeyReveal(session).
• EstablishParty(party).
• Corrupt SC (party). Before defining the seCK security, we define the session freshness notion. Test queries can only be performed on fresh sessions. Definition 1 (Session Freshness). Let Π be a protocol, andÂ andB two honest parties, sid the identifier of a completed session atÂ with peerB, and sid ′ the matching session's identifier. The session sid is said to be locally exposed if one of the following holds.
• A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on sid.
• The implementation atÂ follows the first approach and A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid and a Corrupt SC query onÂ.
• The implementation atÂ follows the second approach and A issues an intermediate result query on sid. The session sid is said to be exposed if (a) it is locally exposed, or (b) its matching session sid ′ exists and is locally exposed, or (c) sid ′ does not exist and A issues a Corrupt SC query on the supposed peerB. An unexposed session is said to be fresh.
Our session freshness conditions match exactly the intuition of the sessions one may hope to protect. In particular, it lowers (more than in the eCK model) the necessary adversary restrictions for any reasonable security definition. Notice that only the queries corresponding to the implementation approach followed by a party can be issued on it.
Definition 2 (Strengthened eCK Security). Let Π be a protocol, such that if two honest parties complete matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key.
The protocol Π is said to be seCK-secure, if no polynomially bounded adversary can distinguish a fresh session key from a random value, chosen under the distribution of session keys, with probability significantly greater than 1/2.
Forward Secrecy. As shown in [14] , no implicitely authenticated two-pass key exchange protocol can achieve forward secrecy 4 . Indeed, our security definition captures weak forward secrecy, which (loosely speaking) is: any session established without an active involvement of the attacker remains secure, even when the implicated parties static keys are disclosed. The seCK security definition can be completed with the session key expiration notion [7] to capture forward secrecy. Although the protocol we propose can be added with a third message, and yield a protocol which (provably) provides forward secrecy, in the continuation, we work with the security definition without forward secrecy, and focus on two-pass DH protocols.
Relations between the seCK and eCK models. In the eCK model, an adversary may compromise the ephemeral key, static key, or the session key at a party, independently of the way the protocol is implemented. The seCK model considers an adversary which may (have a malware running at a party's host machine and) learn all information at the party, except those stored in a tamper-resistant device. The seCK approach seems more prevalent in practice, and reduces the gap that often exists between formal arguments and practical implementations security.
The eCK and seCK session identifiers and matching sessions definitions are the same. When the adversary issues the Corrupt SC query at a party, it is provided with the party's static key; the Corrupt SC query is the same as the eCK StaticKeyReveal query. For a session between two parties, sayÂ andB, following the first implementation approach, the seCK session freshness definition reduces to the eCK freshness. By assuming that all parties follow the first implementation approach, the seCK-security definition reduces to the eCK one; the seCK model encompasses the eCK one.
Proposition 1. Any seCK-secure protocol is also an eCK-secure one.
The seCK model also separates clearly from the eCK model. The eCK model does not consider leakages on intermediate results; and this makes many of the eCK secure protocols insecure in the seCK model. For instance, in the CMQV protocol (shown eCKsecure), an attacker which learns an ephemeral secret exponent in a session, can indefinitely impersonate the session owner; the same holds for the (H)MQV(-C) protocols [29, 30] . It is not difficult to see that NAXOS cannot meet the seCK security definition. The protocols 1 and 2 from [12, pp. 6, 12] (shown eCK-secure) fail in authentication when leakages one the intermediate results are considered. Indeed an attacker, which learns the ephemeral secret exponents s 1 = x + a 1 and s 2 = x + a 2 in a session atÂ (see the steps 2 and 3 of the protocols 1 and 2 [12] ), can indefinitely impersonateÂ to any party. Notice that the attacker cannot computeÂ's static key from s 1 and s 2 , while it is not difficult to see that leakages on s 1 (or s 2 ) and the ephemeral key, in the same session implyÂ's static key disclosure.
The seCK model is practically stronger than the CK model [7] . Key Compromise Impersonation resilience, for instance, is captured in the seCK model while not in CK model. As shown in [9] , and illustrated in section 2 with Protocol P, the CK model is enhanced when matching sessions are defined using matching conversations. In addition, the seCK reveal query definitions go beyond the usual CK session state definition (ephemeral DH exponents). Compared to the CK HMQV model 5 [14] , the reveal query definitions are enhanced in the seCK model to capture attacks based on intermediate result leakages. In the HMQV security arguments [14, subsection 7.4] , the session state is defined to contain the ephemeral DH exponent 6 ; the HMQV protocol does not meet the seCK-security [29, 30] .
The Strengthened MQV Protocol
In this section, we present the strengthened MQV protocol, and its building blocks, to show that the seCK security definition is useful, and not limiting; as seCK-secure protocols can be built with usual building blocks. We start with the following variants of the FXCR and FDCR signature schemes [29] . The security of the FXCR-1 and FDCR-1 schemes can be shown with arguments similar to that of the FXCR and FDCR schemes [29, 30] . 
Proposition 2 (FXCR-1 Security). Under the CDH assumption in G and the RO model, there is no adaptive probabilistic polynomial time attacker, which given a public key B,
a challenge X 0 (B, X 0 ∈ R G * ),
Proposition 3 (FDCR-1 Security). Let
A = G a , B, X 0 ∈ R G * (A = B), Y 0 , σ 0 ) such that: (1) DSigÂ ,B (m 1 0 , m 2 0 , X 0 , Y 0 ) = σ 0 ; and (2) (Y 0 , σ 0 )
was not obtained from the signing oracle with a query on some
IV) The shared session key is K.
Remark 1.
It may appear that the the SMQV and FHMQV protocols are the same, but this is not the case. Indeed, when implementing the FHMQV or SMQV protocol, it may be desirable to reduce the sensitivity of implementation to side channel attacks [13] . In the second implementation approach, this seems to be more convenient in SMQV than in FHMQV. In fact, in the FHMQV protocol, the static private keys are always multiplied with publicly known digest values, and then potentially sensitive to well-targeted side channel attacks. In the SMQV protocol, the static private keys are only used in an addition, with the second operand (involving the ephemeral private key) used once, and unknown to the attacker. This makes side channel attacks aiming to reveal the static private keys significantly more difficult against SMQV than against FHMQV.
In SMQV, the shared secret σ is the FDCR-1 signature ofÂ andB, on challenges X, Y and messagesÂ,B (the representation ofÂ andB's identities). The parties identities and ephemeral keys are used in the final digest computation to make the key replication resilience security attribute immediate (and also to avoid unknown key share attacks). A run of SMQV requires 2.5 times a single exponentiation (2.17 times a single exponentiation when the multiple exponentiation technique [22, Algorithm 14 .88] is used); this efficiency equals that of the remarkable (H, FH)MQV protocols. SMQV provides all the security attributes of the (C, H)MQV protocols, added with ephemeral secret exponent leakage resilience.
Moreover, suppose an implementation of SMQV or (C, H)MQV using an untrusted 7 host machine together with a device; and suppose that the session keys are used by some applications running on the host machine, and that the ephemeral keys are computed on the device in idle-time. This idle-time pre-computation seems common in practice [28] (and possible in both the (C, H)MQV and SMQV protocols). But, as (C, H)MQV is not ephemeral secret exponent leakage resilient [29, 30] , the ephemeral secret exponents (s A = x + da or s B = y + eb) cannot be used on the untrusted host machine. machine, after the ephemeral secret exponent is computed on the device. Because the session key is used on the host machine, and a leakage of only the ephemeral secret exponent, in a SMQV session, does not compromise any other session; there is no need to protect the ephemeral secret exponent more than the session key. In SMQV, the non-idle time computational effort of the device reduces to few non-costly operations (one integer addition, one integer multiplication, and one digest computation), while for (C, H)MQV at least one exponentiation has to be performed on the device in non idle-time. Table 1 summarizes the comparisons between SMQV and some other DH protocols. All the security reductions are performed using the Random Oracle model [2] ; incoming ephemeral keys are validated 8 . KEA1 stands for "Knowledge of Exponent Assumption" [4] , CDH and GDH stand respectively for "Computational DH" and "Gap DH" assumptions [26] . The 'A', 'D', 'E', and 'M' stand respectively for integer addition, digest computation, exponentiation, and integer multiplication. The NC column indicates the naive count efficiency (i.e., without optimizations from [22, Algorithm 14 .88] and [25] ); NICE 1 and NICE 2 indicate the non-idle time computational effort of the device in the two approaches (when ephemeral keys are computed in idle-time).
The MQV protocol has no security reduction 9 . The FHMQV security arguments are provided in a model which considers intermediate results and ephemeral key leakages in two separate settings; the model implicitly assumes that all parties follow the same implementation approach, and cannot be shown to encompass the CK or eCK models. In contrast, the seCK model considers also the security of sessions between parties following different implementation approaches, and its matching sessions definition makes it encompass the eCK model. The CMQV and NAXOS protocols are shown eCK-secure, they both use the NAXOS transformation.
The NAXOS-C security arguments are provided in a variant of the eCK model, called combined eCK model (ceCK) [24] , geared to the post-specified peer model. In the post 10 model, the identity of a peer may be unknown at session activation (it is learned during the protocol execution). It is worthwhile to mention that, the separation between the pre and post models security seems unclear. The protocol P claimed secure in the pre model, and not executable in the post model (unless "modified in a fundamental way") [24, section 3.1], is insecure in the pre model, if the considered security model is strong enough. 8 Ephemeral key validation is voluntarily omitted in the HMQV design [14] , but the HMQV protocol is known to be insecure if ephemeral keys are not validated [23] . 9 We are aware of [16] , which shows that under the RO model and the CDH assumption, the MQV variant wherein d and e are computed asH(X) andH(Y ), is secure in a model of their own design. But, for this MQV variant, an attacker which finds x0 ∈ [1, q − 1] such thatH(G x 0 ) = 0, can impersonate any party to any other party. Finding such an x0 requires O(2 l ) digest computations. 10 The terms 'pre-specified peer' and 'post-specified peer' are respectively shortened to 'pre' and 'post'.
The HMQV protocol is executable in the post model, but claimed insecure (in the postmodel). In fact, the proposed attack [24, section 3.2] cannot be performed in practice; not because it requires an important on-line computational effort (2 60 operations, when the order of G is a 160-bit prime), but since the step (2.c) of the attack cannot be performed without changing theM found at the step (2.b). In practice,M (is a certificate, and) is defined to contain M (which is provided to the certification authority at certificate issuance), and when M is changed, so isM (notice also that changing M requires another certificate issuance); and then, after the step (2.c) of the attack, the claimed equality betweenH(X,M ) andH(X,B) does not hold. For the Σ 0 protocol, secure in the post model, while insecure in the pre one [24, section 3.3] , the model in which it is shown secure in the post model [8] is not strong enough. It is not difficult to see, for instance, that the Σ 0 protocol is both eCK and ceCK insecure.
The SMQV protocol provides more security attributes than the NAXOS(+, -C), (C, H)MVQ protocols, in addition to allow particularly efficient implementations, in environments wherein a tamper proof device is used to store private keys.
Proposition 4.
Under the GDH assumption in G and the RO model, the SMQV protocol is seCK-secure.
Concluding Remarks
We discussed security shades in the (e)CK moddels. We illustrated the limitations of the CK matching sessions definition; and the insecurity of the NAXOS type protocols when leakages on ephemeral DH exponents are considered. We proposed a new security model, the strengthened eCK model, which encompasses the eCK one, and practically captures the security attributes considered in the CK model. We proposed the Strengthened MQV protocol, which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementation environments using an untrusted host machine and a tamper-resistant device; in such an environment, the non-idle time computational effort of the device, in a SMQV implementation, reduces to few non-costly operations.
In a forthcoming stage, we will be interested in the enhancement of existing protocols to meet the seCK security definition, and the extension of the strengthened eCK model to consider a wider class of attacks.
A Security Analysis of the SMQV Protocol
In accordance with our security model, the following session activation queries are allowed.
• Send(Â,B), which makesÂ perform the step I) of Protocol 3, and create a session with identifier (Â,B, X, ⋆, I).
• Send(Â,B, X), which makesB perform the step II) of Protocol 3, and create a session with identifier (B,Â, Y, X, R).
• Send(Â,B, X, Y ), which makesÂ update the session identifier (Â,B, X, ⋆, I) (if any)
to (Â,B, X, Y, I) and perform the step III) of SMQV. The queries in Set 1 are the following: EphemeralKeyReveal, Corrupt SC , SessionKeyReveal, and EstablishParty. In Set 2, the allowed queries are: (i) Corrupt SC , to obtain the static private key of a party; (ii) SessionKeyReveal, to obtain a session key; (iii) SecretExponentReveal, to obtain a secret exponent s = xd+a or ye+b; (iv) SessionSignatureReveal, to obtain a session signature σ; (v) EstablishParty(party) to register a static public key on behalf of a party.
Recall that an algorithm is said to be a Decisional Diffie-Hellman Oracle (DDHO) if on input G, X = G x , Y = G y , and Z ∈ R G, it outputs 1 if and only if Z = G xy . And the Gap DH (GDH) assumption [26] is said to hold in G * if given a DDHO, there is no polynomially bounded algorithm, which solves the CDH problem in G, with non-negligible success probability.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.
It is immediate from the definition of SMQV that if two honest parties complete matching sessions, they compute the same session key. Suppose an attacker A, which succeeds with probability significantly greater than 1/2 in distinguishing a fresh session key from a random value chosen under the distribution of session keys. Distinguishing a fresh session key from a random value can be performed only in one of the following ways. Guessing attack: A guesses correctly the test session key. Key replication attack: A succeeds in making two non-matching sessions yield the same session key, it then issues a session key reveal query on one of the sessions, and uses the other as test session. Forging attack: A computes the session signature σ, and issues a digest query to get the session key. Under the RO model, guessing and key replications attacks cannot succeed, except with negligible probability. Key replication attacks cannot succeed, as if X = X ′ , or Y = Y ′ , or A =Â ′ , orB =B ′ , and no substring ofÂ equalsB (and conversely) the probability that
We thus suppose that A succeeds with non-negligible probability in forging attack. Let E be the event "A succeeds in forging the signature of some fresh session (that we designate by sid 0 = (Â,B, X 0 , Y 0 , ς) )."
The event E divides in E.1: "A succeeds in forging the signature of a fresh with matching session," and E.2: "A succeeds in forging the signature of a fresh without matching session." It suffices to show that neither E.1 nor E.2 can happen with non-negligible 11 probability.
Analysis of E.1
Suppose that E.1 occurs with non-negligible probability; at least one of the following events occurs with non-negligible probability. E.1.1: "E.1 ∧ bothÂ andB follow the first implementation approach"; E.1.2: "E.1 ∧ bothÂ andB follow the second implementation approach"; E.1.3: "E.1 ∧Â andB follow different implementation approaches." We have to show that none of E.1.1, E.1.2 and E.1.3 can occur, except with negligible probability.
Analysis of E.1.1. Since the test session is required to be fresh, the strongest queries that A can perform onÂ,B, the test session, and its matching session are (i) Corrupt SC queries on bothÂ andB; (ii) EphemeralKeyReveal queries on both sid 0 and sid ′ 0 ; (iii) a Corrupt SC query onÂ and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid ′ 0 ; (iv) an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid 0 and a Corrupt SC query onB. It thus suffices to show that none of the following events can happen with non-negligible probability since from any polynomial time machine, which succeeds in E.1.1 and performs weaker queries, one can build a polynomial time machine which succeeds with the same probability, and performs one the strongest allowed queries. E.1.1.1: "E.1.1 ∧ A issues Corrupt SC queries on bothÂ andB"; E.1.1.2: "E.1.1 ∧ A issues EphemeralKeyReveal queries on both sid 0 and sid ′ 0 "; E.1.1.3: "E.1.1 ∧ A issues a Corrupt SC query onÂ and an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid ′ 0 "; E.1.1.4: "E.1.1 ∧ A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on sid 0 and a Corrupt SC query onB."
Event E.1.1.1. Suppose that E.1.1.1 occurs with non-negligible probability, using A we build a polynomial time CDH solver S, which succeeds with non-negligible probability.
The solver interacts with A as follows.
(1) S simulates A's environment, with n partiesP 1 , . . . ,P n , and assigns to eachP k a random static key pair (p k , P k = G p k ), together with an implementation approach indication. We only suppose that the number of parties following the first implementation approach is n 1 2. S starts with two empty digest records H 1 and H 2 . Since A is polynomial (in |q|), we suppose that each party is activated at most m times (m, n L(|q|) for some polynomial L). S chooses i, j ∈ R {k |P k follows the first implementation approach}, and t ∈ R [1, m] (with these choices, S is guessing the test session). We refer toP i asÂ andP j asB. • A halts with a test session different from the t-th session atÂ.
• A issues a SessionKeyReveal or an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session.
• A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. (12) If A provides a guess σ 0 of the test session signature, S outputs
as a guess for CDH(X 0 , Y 0 ). Otherwise S aborts.
The simulated environment is perfect except with negligible probability; and if A is polynomial, so is S. When A activates the test session and its matching session, the ephemeral keys X 0 and Y 0 it is provided with are chosen uniformly at random in G * ; their distribution is the same as that of the real X and Y. Event E.1.1.2. If E.1.1.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, using A, we build a polynomial time CDH solver, which succeeds with non-negligible probability. For this purpose, we modify the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.1 as follows.
• S takes as input A, B ∈ R G * .
•Â andB's public keys are set to A and B; the corresponding private keys are unknown.
(S also keeps a list of the completed session identifiers together with the session keys).
• At Send(P m ,P l , Y ) query, withP l =Â orB, S responds as follows.
-S chooses x ∈ R [1, q − 1], computes X = G x , creates a session with identifier sid ′ = (P l ,P m , X, Y, R), and provides A with the message (P l ,P m , X).
P l ) = e, and the sid ′ session key to κ.
• At Send(P l ,P m , X, Y ) query, withP l =Â orB, S does the following.
-S updates the session identifier (P l ,P m , X, ⋆, I) (if any) to sid = (P l ,P m , X, Y, I).
-And, (i) if a value is already assigned to the sid ′ session key, S sets the sid session key to that of sid ′ .
(ii) Else, if a digest query was previously issued on some ψ = (σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ), and if σ = CDH(X d P l , Y e P m ) (in this case, d and e are already defined, and the verification is performed using the DDHO), S sets the sid session key to H(ψ). (iii) Else, S chooses κ ∈ R {0, 1} λ , and sets the sid session key to κ; if no value was previously assigned to
• At A's digest query on ψ = (σ,P l ,P m , X, Y ), withP l =Â orB, orP m =Â orB, S responds as follows.
-If there is some κ such that (ψ, κ) already belongs to H 2 , S returns κ.
-Else, (i) if there is an already completed session with identifier sid = (P l ,P m , X, Y, I) or sid ′ , and if σ = CDH(X d P l , Y e P m ), then S returns the completed session's key.
(ii) Else, S chooses κ ∈ R {0, 1} λ , sets H(ψ) = κ, and provides A with κ; if no value was previously assigned to
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; else S chooses
, and provides A with the message (Â,B, X 0 = G x 0 ). • When A activates the session matching the t-th session atÂ, S chooses y 0 , ∈ R [1, q−1], and provides A with (B,Â, Y 0 = G y 0 ).
• If A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session, S answers faithfully.
• S aborts in any of the following situations:
-A halts with a test session different from the t-th session atÂ; -A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session; -A issues a Corrupt SC or an EstablishParty query onÂ orB; • If A halts with a guess σ 0 fo the test session signature, S outputs a guess of CDH (A, B) from σ 0 , x 0 , y 0 , d 0 , and e 0 .
Under the RO model, the simulation remains perfect, except with negligible probability. And, if E.1.1.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, A succeeds with non-negligible probability under this simulation. If A succeeds and S guesses correctly the test session (this happens with probability (n 2 1 m) −1 Pr(E.1.1.2)), S outputs CDH (A, B) . Under the GDH assumption and the RO model, E.1.1.2 cannot occur, unless with negligible probability.
Events E.1. 1.3 and E.1.1.4 . The roles ofÂ andB in E.1. 1.3 and E.1.1.4 are symmetrical; it then suffices to discuss E.1.1.3. If E.1.1.3 occurs with non-negligible probability, using A, we build a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with non-negligible probability.
We modify the simulation in the analysis if E.1.1.1 as follows.
• S takes as input X 0 , B ∈ R G * .
•B's public key is set to B (the corresponding private key is unknown), andÂ's key 
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; otherwise, S provides A with (Â,B, X 0 ) (recall the solver takes as input X 0 and B).
• When A activates the session matching the t-th session atÂ, S chooses y 0 ∈ R [1, q −1], and provides A with (B,Â, Y 0 ).
• If A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the session matching the t-th session atÂ, S answers faithfully.
• In any of the following situations, S aborts.
-A halts with a test session different from the t-th session atÂ.
-A issues a Corrupt SC query onB or an EstablishParty query onÂ orB.
-A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ.
• If A halts with a guess σ 0 , S produces σ 0 (X
as a guess for CDH(X 0 , B).
The simulation remains perfect, except with negligible probability; the solver S guesses correctly the test session with probability (n 2 1 m) −1 . If A succeeds under this simulation, and S guesses correctly the test session, S outputs CDH(X 0 , B). Hence if A suc-ceeds with non-negligible probability in E.1.1.3, S outputs with non-negligible probability CDH(X 0 , B), contradicting the GDH assumption.
None of the events E.1.1.1, E.1.1.2, E.1.1.3 or E.1.1.4 can occur with non-negligible probability; E.1.1 cannot occur, unless with negligible probability.
Analysis of E.1.2. Suppose that E.1.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, we derive from A a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with non-negligible probability. The strongest queries that S can issue onÂ,B, the test session and its matching session are Corrupt SC queries on bothÂ andB. (Recall that bothÂ andB follow the second approach). We modify the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.1 as follows.
• S takes X 0 , Y 0 ∈ R G * as input.
• A's environment, is simulated in the same way as in the analysis of E.1.1.1, except that i and j are chosen in {k |P k follows the second implementation approach} (we suppose here that n − n 1 2, and still refer toP i asÂ andP j asB).
• S aborts in the following situations.
-A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB.
-A issues a SessionKeyReveal, a SecretExponentReveal, or a SessionSignatureReveal query on the test session or its matching session.
The simulation remains prefect, and if A is polynomial, so is S. In addition, S guesses correctly the test session with probability ((n − n 1 ) 2 m) −1 ; and if A succeeds and S guesses correctly the test session, it outputs CDH(X 0 , Y 0 ) (from A's forgery a, b, d 0 and e 0 ). S succeeds with probability ((n − n 1 ) 2 m) −1 Pr(E.1.2) which is non-negligible, unless Pr(E.1 .2) is negligible. Under the GDH assumption and the RO model, E.1.2 cannot occur with non-negligible probability.
Analysis of E.1.3. In E.1.3 (Â andB follow different implementation approaches), eitherÂ orB follows the first implementation approach; we suppose thatÂ follows the first implementation approach. (As the test session's matching session exists, from any polynomial time machine which succeeds in E.1.3 whenÂ follows the first approach, one can derive a polynomial time machine which succeeds with the same probability whenÂ follows the second approach.) The strongest queries that A can perform onÂ,B, the test session, and its matching session are (i) Corrupt SC queries on bothÂ andB, (ii) an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session and a Corrupt SC query onB. And, since from any polynomial time machine which succeeds in E.1.3, and issues weaker queries, one can build a polynomial time machine which succeeds with the same probability and performs one of the above strongest queries, it suffices to consider the following events. E.1.3.1: "E.1.3 ∧ A issues Corrupt SC queries on bothÂ andB"; E.1.3.2: "E.1.3 ∧ A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session and a Corrupt SC query onB." To show that E.1.3.1 cannot occur with non-negligible probability, we use the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.1, modified as follows.
• The environment remains the same except that i ∈ R {k |P k follows the first implementation approach}, and j ∈ R {k |P k follows the second implementation approach}.
• S aborts in any of the following situations.
-A issues a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ or its matching session.
-A issues a SecretExponentReveal, or a SessionSignatureReveal query on the session matching the test session, or an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session. -A issues an EstablishParty query onÂ orB. Using the same arguments, as in the analysis of E.1.1.1, S is a polynomial time CDH solver which succeeds with probability (n 1 (n − n 1 )m) −1 Pr(E.1.3.1). Under the GDH assumption and the RO model, Pr(E.1.3.1) is negligible.
Making S take as input X 0 , B ∈ R G * (the arguments are similar to that used in the analysis of the event E.1.1.3), one can show also that E.1.3.2 cannot occur, unless with negligible probability.
Analysis of E.2
Suppose that E.2 (A succeeds in forging the signature of some fresh session without matching session) occurs with non negligible probability. As E.2 divides in E.2.1: "E.2 ∧ bothÂ andB follow the first implementation approach"; E.2.2: "E.2 ∧ bothÂ andB follow the second implementation approach"; E.2.3: "E.2 ∧Â andB follow different implementation approaches"; at least one of the events E. We modify here the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.2 to abort if A activates a session matching the t-th session atÂ. The simulated environment remains perfect, except with negligible probability. And from any valid forgery σ 0 , and a correct guess of the test session, S outputs A y 0 e 0 +b (from σ 0 , x 0 , d 0 , and e 0 ). S is polynomial; and if E.2.1.2 occurs with non-negligible probability, on input A, B ∈ R G * , S outputs Y 0 and A y 0 e 0 +b with non-negligible probability. Hence, using the "oracle replay technique" [27] , S yields a polynomial time CHD solver, which succeeds with non-negligible probability; contradicting the GDH assumption. Let B be the family of polynomial time attackers which at some point of their run, execute Seq1 (the attackers may execute Seq1 many times).
Consider a polynomial time attacker A / ∈ B, and suppose that E.2.2 occurs with nonnegligible probability. Using A, we build a polynomial time FXCR-1 signature forger, which succeeds with non-negligible probability. For this purpose, we modify the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.1 as follows.
• Both i, j ∈ R {k |P k follows the second implementation approach};Â's key pair is set
andB's public key to B; the corresponding private key is unknown (we suppose thatÂ =B).
• At Send(P l ,B, X) query, S answers as follows. Later, when A issues Send(B,P l , Y, X), S sets e = H 1 (Y, X,B,P l ), and completes the session (B,P l , Y, X, I).
• When A activates the t-th session atÂ, if the peer is notB, S aborts; else, S provides A with (Â,B, X 0 ). • S aborts in any of the following situations.
-A activates atB a session matching the t-th session atÂ.
-A issues a Corrupt SC query onB, or an EstablishParty query onÂ orB.
-A issues a SecretExponentReveal, a SessionSignatureReveal, or a SessionKeyReveal query on the t-th session atÂ. Under the RO model, the simulation of A's environment is perfect, except with negligible probability. The deviation happens when the same Y is chosen twice as outgoing ephemeral key in sessions atB, with the same peerP l , this happens with probability less than m/q (which is negligible). Hence, under this simulation E.2.2 occurs with non-negligible probability. And, when A outputs a correct forgery, and S guesses correctly the test session, S outputs a valid FXCR-1 signature forgery on challenge X 0 and message (Â,B) with respect to the public key B. S succeeds with probability ((n − n 1 ) 2 m)
where negligible terms are ignored, contradicting Proposition 2. Hence for attackers not in B, E.2.2 cannot occur, unless with negligible probability.
For attackers in B, we will not provide a simulation; instead, we show that their success probability is bounded by the success probability of a class of attackers which can be efficiently simulated. Let B be an attacker in B, and let d(|q|) be an upper bound on the number of Z i the attacker chooses at step 2 of Seq1, for simplicity (in the notations), we suppose that whenever B executes Seq1, it chooses d(|q|) Z i s at step 2. Recall that there are n parties, and each party is activated at most m times (n and m are polynomial in |q|).
For all B ∈ B, let B R be an attacker, which receives in addition to B's input, the re-
, and performs exactly the same way as B, except that whenever B executes the sequence of queries Seq1 for the l-th time, B R executes the modified sequence Seq2. And, when B uses, for any other computation, a Z i chosen during the l-th execution Seq1, B R uses Z li . Notice that if B is polynomial, then so is B R . Let V be the set of resource vectors, and t the number of times B executes Seq1 (as each party is activated at most m times, and each execution of Seq1 activatesB, t m). For v ∈ V, we say that B R (v) matches B, if for all l ∈ [1, t], the l-th time B executes Seq1, it chooses {Z l1 , · · · , Z ld } at step 2, and poses Pr(E.2.2 B R (v) ).
To show that the success probability in E.2.2 of an attacker B in B is negligible, it suffices to show that Pr(E.2.2 B R (v) ) is negligible for all v ∈ P oss(V). For this purpose, we provide the simulator with v (recall that we combine the simulator and the attacker B R to build a FXCR-1 forger), and modify the activation of the sessions initiated atB as follows (the other parts of the simulation remain unchanged):
• When the attacker issues Send(B, P i ) for the l-th time, the simulator S does the following: The simulation is consistent for all v ∈ P oss(V) and B R . As S knows, from the resource vector, what will be the incoming ephemeral public key, SecretExponentReveal and SessionSignatureReveal queries are consistently simulated. If B R (v) succeeds in E.2.2 with non-negligible probability, S succeeds in FXCR-1 forgery with non-negligible probability. Hence Pr(E.2.2 B R (v) ) is negligible, for all v ∈ P oss(V) and B R . This implies Pr(E.2.2 B ) is negligible.
Event E.2.3. The test session's matching session does not exist, andÂ andB follow different implementation approaches.
• IfÂ follows the first implementation approach (E.2.3.1), A is allowed to issue either a Corrupt SC query onÂ, or an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session.
-If E.2.3.1.1: "E.2.3.1 ∧ A issues a Corrupt SC query onÂ," occurs with nonnegligible probability. We modify the simulation in the analysis of E.1.1.1 to take as input X 0 , B ∈ R G * , and simulateB's role as in the analysis of E.2.2 (Â's role is simulated as in E.1.1.1). The arguments bounding the success probability of attackers in B (attackers for which a consistent simulation cannot be provided) remain valid. If A succeeds with non-negligible probability, it yields a polynomial time FXCR-1 signature forger which succeeds with non-negligible probability; contradicting Proposition 2. -And, if E.2.3.1.2: "E.2.3.1 ∧ A issues an EphemeralKeyReveal query on the test session," occurs with non-negligible probability, we modify the simulation in E.1.1.1 to take as input A, B ∈ R G * , and abort if A activates a session matching the tth session atÂ. We simulateÂ's role as in E.1.1.2 andB's role as in E.2.2, reusing arguments bounding the success probability of attackers in B. From any valid forgery σ 0 , S outputs σ 0 (Y e 0 0 B) −x 0 d 0 = A y 0 e 0 +b ; and using the oracle replay technique, S yields an efficient CDH solver, contradicting the GDH assumption.
• And, ifÂ follows the second implementation approach, we make S take as input A, B ∈ G * , simulateÂ's role in the same way as that ofB in E.2.2, andB's role as in E.1.1.2, except that when A activates the t-th session atÂ, S chooses x 0 ∈ R [1, q − 1] and provides A with (Â,B, X 0 ) (S also aborts if A activates a session matching the t-th session atÂ). If A succeeds with non-negligible probability, S outputs with non-negligible probability A y 0 e 0 +b , and using the oracle replay technique, S yields an efficient CDH solver; E.2.3 cannot occur, except with negligible probability.
Reflection Attacks IfÂ =B, E.1 reduces to E. query is not allowed onÂ), if A succeeds with non-negligible probability, it yields a polynomial time machine S which on input A outputs with non-negligible probability Y 0 and (Y e 0 0 A) a , and S yields a squaring CDH solver, contradicting the GDH assumption. Neither E.1 nor E.2 can occur with non-negligible probability, the SMQV protocol is seCK-secure.
